The Futility of Antitrust Attacks on Tie-In Sales: An Economic and Legal Analysis by Butler, Henry N. et al.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 36 | Issue 2 Article 2
1-1984
The Futility of Antitrust Attacks on Tie-In Sales: An




Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Henry N. Butler, W. J. Lane, and Owen R. Phillips, The Futility of Antitrust Attacks on Tie-In Sales: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 36
Hastings L.J. 173 (1984).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol36/iss2/2
The Futility of Antitrust Attacks on Tie-In
Sales: An Economic and Legal Analysis
By HENRY N. BUTLER,*
W.J. LANE,**
and OWEN R. PHILLIPS***
The Supreme Court has consistently condemned tying arrange-
ments' as antitrust violations, primarily on the ground that they serve to
extend a seller's monopoly power over the tying product into the tied
product market. 2 The Court's condemnation is premised on three objec-
tions: that tying arrangements (1) foreclose the seller's competitors from
opportunities to make sales of the tied product, (2) make entry into the
tying or tied product markets more difficult, and (3) displace buyers'
freedom of choice by coercing them into purchasing a product that they
do not desire. 3 These objections have been widely criticized by econo-
mists and legal commentators who question the adverse economic effects
of tying arrangements.
4
We attack the Court's treatment of tying arrangements from a dif-
ferent angle. We assume, for the sake of argument, that the Court's eco-
nomic assumptions concerning the effects of tying arrangements are
sound. We then demonstrate that commonly used, legal alternative pric-
ing strategies can generate profits approximating those available through
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1. The Supreme Court defines a tying arrangement as "an agreement by a party to sell
one product [the tying product] but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a
different [or tied] product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any
other supplier." Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
2. See infra notes 15-16 & accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 15-30 & accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 42-85 & accompanying text.
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illegal tie-ins. 5  This result contradicts the Court's implicit assumption
that the prohibition of tying arrangements forces firms to return to a
competitive market solution. Little is gained, then, by prohibiting tying
arrangements, and the cost of enforcing the prohibition may well exceed
any resulting benefits.
The Article first presents the traditional legal and economic analysis
reflected in the Supreme Court's treatment of tying arrangements, as well
as the widely accepted economic criticisms of this view. It then presents
an economic model of the alternative pricing strategy we have in mind: a
nonlinear pricing strategy, achieved through a particular form of product
bundling. We show that by allowing buyers to choose between purchas-
ing the tied good at a competitive price and purchasing a bundle of both
the tying and tied good at a price that supplies their desired amount of
the tied good, sellers can earn profits approaching those which can be
earned through a coercive tying arrangement. We further demonstrate
some positive consumer welfare effects of this strategy. We then show
that this non-coercive bundling strategy is free from antitrust liability.
We conclude that the current per se prohibition of tying arrangements
should be abandoned because, even if the Court is correct about the eco-
nomic effects of such practices, the benefit from forcing firms to shift
from coercive tie-ins to this alternative pricing strategy is small and does
not justify the cost of enforcing the prohibition. We advocate a rule of
reason approach that presumes legality, thus prohibiting tying arrange-
ments only in those few cases in which the arrangements have a deleteri-
ous effect on consumer welfare.
The Conventional Wisdom: Law and Economics
Legal Analysis of Tying Arrangements
Tying arrangements typically are challenged under either section 1
of the Sherman Act 6 or section 3 of the Clayton Act.7 An examination of
5. Tie-ins continue to exist, of course, because their purpose is not merely to generate
profits through increased sales of the tied product. They are often used, for example, to moni-
tor the use of the tying product and to increase its effective price to high intensity users, who
value it more highly. See infra notes 74-85 & accompanying text. These uses have little, if
anything, to do with market extension. Id.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (providing in part: "Every contract, combination, in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations is declared to be illegal.").
7. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982) (providing:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such com-
merce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented,. . . on
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the case law associated with these challenges reveals the evolution and
refinement of a legal analysis8 that involves a consideration of three fac-
tors: first, the existence of two distinct and separable products, 9 with the
the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall
not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other com-
modities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of
such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding
may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce.)
The Clayton Act thus deals more explicitly with tying arrangements than does the Sherman
Act. Because the Clayton Act's application is limited, however, to sales or leases involving
"goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities," the Sherman Act
must be used to attack tying contracts involving other items. See, e.g., Fortner Enters., Inc., v.
United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (credit); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (land); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594
(1953) (services). Also, it should be noted that § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1982), authorizes the FTC to ban any practice that conflicts with the central
policy of either the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316,
321-22 (1966).
8. The legality of tying arrangements was first considered in the context of patent in-
fringement actions. In the typical suit, a patentee who practiced tying would sue a competing
manufacturer of the tied good, and the manufacturer would assert as a defense to the action
that the patentee's tying arrangement was illegal under the Sherman Act. However, the Sher-
man Act was held to offer no defense to the action. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912);
Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896).
The passage of the Clayton Act reversed that trend.
One commentator has suggested that Henry v. A. . Dick Co. provided the legislative
initiative for § 3 of the Clayton Act. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTI-
TRUST 432-33 (1977). Since the passage of the Clayton Act, the Court, for equitable reasons,
has denied a patentee relief for infringement where it has found that the patentee, through
tying, was attempting to extend its monopoly power into new markets. See, eg., Morton Salt
Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp.,
283 U.S. 27 (1931).
9. The products are often either complements or substitutes. Two products are comple-
mentary when an increase in the demand for one will lead to an increase in the demand for the
other. Alternatively stated, two products are said to be complements when a decrease in the
price of one increases the quantity consumed of both products. Two products are substitutes
when a decrease in the price of one good results in an increase in the quantity consumed of that
good, but a decrease in the amount consumed of the other good. Common examples are tennis
rackets and tennis balls (complements), and butter and margarine (substitutes).
The initial determination of whether there indeed is a tying arrangement-specifically,
whether there are two products that are being sold in one "package"-is referred to as the
"existence" question. See Bauer, A Simplified Approach to Tying Arrangements: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 33 VAND. L. REv. 283, 305-08 (1980). Judge Posner makes an interesting
observation concerning this requirement:
[A] . . . serious problem arises from the fact that . . . the concept of a tie-in is
conventional rather than analytical. We think of a mimeograph machine and its
paper and ink as separate products which if sold together are "tied," but we do not
think of a left and right glove, or an automobile and its radiator, in the same way.
Yet nothing in the traditional legal thinking about tie-ins enables one to distinguish
among these cases. The tie-in doctrine furnishes no answer to the question of when a
sale consists of a combination of separate products or when it is a single product
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seller conditioning the sale of one product on the purchase of the other; '0
second, the seller's possession of considerable economic power in the ty-
ing product market; I I and third, the arrangement's effect on a "not in-
substantial" volume of commerce. 12 Generally, a Sherman Act violation
is shown only if all three of these factors are established, 13 whereas the
Clayton Act requires only the first plus either of the other two factors. 14
This legal analysis reflects and is based upon the Supreme Court's
view that tying arrangements involve the exercise and extension of mar-
ket power. 15 The Court has objected to tying arrangements on the basis
made up of components. Since virtually all products have components, the potential
reach of the doctrine is thus devastating. I suppose that what keeps the doctrine
from expanding to its logical limits is a tacit assumption that the more obvious com-
bination sales could readily be justified by their lower costs compared to selling the
components separately. But there is something seriously wrong about a doctrine
under which virtually every combination sale is prima facie an unlawful tie-in that
the seller may have to convince a jury is cost justified.
R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 181 (1976).
10. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1561-65 (1984). Com-
pare Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613-15 (1954) (tying ar-
rangement not found because the arrangement did not link two distinct markets for products
that were distinguishable in the eyes of buyers) with Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel
Corp. 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (tying arrangement found where sale involved two independent
transactions, separately priced and purchased from the buyer's perspective). See generally
Ross, The Single Product Issue in Antitrust Tying: A Functional Approach, 23 EMORY L.J. 963
(1974).
11. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 104 S. Ct. at 1566-67 n.6; see also id. at 1571 n.6 (O'Conner, J.
concurring). Commentators have attacked this evidentiary requirement. See, e.g., Slawson, A
Stronger, Simpler Tie-In Doctrine, 25 ANTITRUST BULL. 671 (1980); Comment, The Presump-
tion of Market Power in Sales of Legally Differentiated Tying Products, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1305
(1978).
Patents have been used to establish market power in the tying product market in many
leading tie-in cases. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947);
IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936). Posner criticizes this role of patents in tie-in cases.
See R. POSNER, supra note 9, at 173 n.4 (1976).
12. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 104 S. Ct. at 1560.
13. Id. at 1560-61; Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09
(1953).
14. Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 345 U.S. at 608-09.
15. See id. at 611 ("[T]he essence of illegality in tying agreements is the wielding of mo-
nopolistic leverage; a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire
into the next."); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949) ("Tying agree-
ments serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition.")
One noted authority states: "The consistent judicial instinct has been that these arrange-
ments have but a single purpose and effect, to extend the seller's power in the market for the
tying product into that for the tied product." L. SULLIVAN, supra note 8, at 431.
This traditional view is reflected in a number of commentaries. See, e.g., Austin, The
Tying Arrangement. A Critique and Some New Thoughts, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 88, 89; Bauer,
supra note 9, at 298; Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining
Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARV. L. REV. 913,
944 n.95 (1952); Slawson, supra note 11, at 677-84; Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrange-
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of three theories about the alleged adverse effects of tying: that tying
arrangements may (1) foreclose competition in the tied product market;
(2) create barriers to entry in either the tying or tied product market; and
(3) coerce buyers.
The theory that tying arrangements foreclose competition in the tied
product market is based on the notion that the seller of the tying product
is using its power in the tying product market to make sales of the tied
product that it would not otherwise have made.16 Thus, the buyer, who
needs to obtain the tying product from the tie-in seller, 17 is "forced"' 8 to
take the tied product from the same source, even though the buyer might
otherwise have gone elsewhere for various reasons.' 9 By "restrain[ing]
competition on the merits" 20 in this way, the tying arrangement allegedly
forecloses competitors from opportunities to make sales of the tied
product.
The foreclosure theory has provided the primary impetus for the
Supreme Court's development of a per se rule of illegality with respect to
tying arrangements. Perhaps the most famous statement of the rule in
this regard is found in International Salt Co. v. United States.21 The
court, holding that the defendant's practice of tying a requirements con-
tract for the sale of rock salt to a lease of its patented salt processing
machine was illegal, stated that it was "unreasonable, per se, to foreclose
competitors from any substantial market. . . . The volume of business
affected by these contracts cannot be said to be insignificant or insubstan-
tial and the tendency of the arrangement to the accomplishment of mo-
nopoly seems obvious."'22 This and several other cases demonstrate the
Court's concern that tying arrangements are vehicles for expanding mo-
nopoly power from the tying product market to the tied product market
through the foreclosure of competitors in the latter market.23 The wis-
dom of this analysis, and the plausibility of its assumptions, have been
ments Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REv. 50, 59-62 (1958); Note, The Logic of
Foreclosure: Tie-In Doctrine after Fortner v. U.S. Steel, 79 YALE L. J. 86, 91-94 (1969). The
Court has recently reiterated its concern with the foreclosure aspects of tying arrangements.
See Jefferson Parish Hosp., 104 S. Ct. at 1565; infra notes 31-41 & accompanying text.
16. The Court views this as the traditional objection to tie-ins. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958); IL POSNER, supra note 9, at 171-72; Note, supra note 15,
at 91-94.
17. This need results from the lack of competition in the tying product's market.
18. The "forcing" with which tying doctrine is concerned is discussed infra at notes 30-
41 & accompanying text.
19. These reasons might include lower price or higher quality.
20. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 104 S. Ct. at 1566.
21. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
22. Id. at 396.
23. See, e.g., Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel, 394 U.S. 495, 504-06 (1969);
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seriously questioned. 24 Nevertheless, the Court has recently demon-
strated its continuing adherence to the foreclosure theory of tying ar-
rangements, and it has reaffirmed, by a narrow margin, the application of
the per se rule to tying arrangements on the basis of this objection.
25
The Court also has voiced, at various times, other objections to ty-
ing arrangements. The most significant of these is that tying arrange-
ments create obstacles to the entry of potential competitors into the tying
or the tied product market. These barriers to entry allegedly arise be-
cause the tie-ins force potential entrants to enter both markets at the
same time, which presumably is riskier and more difficult than entering
only one market.
2 6
The barriers to entry objection to tie-ins was articulated in United
Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States.27 The defendant, which con-
trolled over ninety-five percent of the shoe machinery market, refused to
lease its shoe machinery unless the lessee also agreed to purchase supplies
from the defendant-lessor. 2 8 The government argued that a new compet-
itor in the supplies market would be foreclosed from ninety-five percent
of that market. Thus, an entrant who sought to compete in the supplies
market would also have to enter the shoe machinery market, but entry
would be hindered by United Shoe's well-established position. The
Court concluded that the total impact of the tying arrangement was to
insulate the seller from the threat of new entry in either market, and the
arrangement was held illegal.
2 9
The Court's third objection, that tying arrangements coerce buyers,
has been an issue in many tying arrangement cases. At times the Court
has seemed to treat coercion as an independent objection to tie-ins, a
seemingly populist notion which is based on the displacement of the
buyer's freedom of choice. 30 More often, however, coercion is treated as
an issue in determining whether adverse economic effects-either fore-
closure or barriers to entry-can be presumed to result from a challenged
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958); IBM v. United States, 298 U.S.
131 (1936).
24. See infra notes 42-85 & accompanying text.
25. See Jefferson Parish Hosp., 104 S. Ct. 1551; infra notes 31-41 & accompanying text.
26. See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 157 (1959). For a critique of this view, see R. POSNER, supra note 9, at 176.
27. 258 U.S. 451 (1922); see also Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 371 (1965).
28. 258 U.S. at 455-57.
29. Id. at 457-58.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry.
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958); see also Blair & Finci, The Individual Coercion
Doctrine and Tying Arrangements: An Economic Analysis, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 531, 539
(1983).
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tying practice. The Court's most recent tying arrangement decision, Jef-
ferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde,31 reflects this latter view.
Jefferson Parish Hospital involved an exclusive contract between a
hospital and a firm of anesthesiologists, requiring all anesthesiological
services for the hospital's patients to be performed by that firm.32 An
anesthesiologist, who was not a member of either the firm or the hospi-
tal's staff, brought suit alleging that the contract violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act.33 The plaintiff's theory was that the contract was an ille-
gal tying arrangement because users of the hospital's operating rooms
(the tying product) were compelled to purchase the hospital's chosen
anesthesiological services (the tied product), the hospital possessed suffi-
cient market power in the tying product market to coerce purchasers of
the tied product, and the arrangement affected a "not insubstantial
amount of interstate commerce.
' '34
The District Court found that the anticompetitive consequences of
the contract were minimal and were outweighed by benefits in the form
of improved patient care.35 The Court of Appeals, however, accepted the
plaintiff's arguments and reversed the lower court, declaring the contract
illegal per se.36 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, re-
fusing to apply the per se rule because of insufficient evidence to support
a finding of sufficient market power in the tying product.
37
The Court's decision defined coercion and clarified its role in tying
arrangement analysis. After finding that the contract in question re-
quired the purchase of two distinguishable services, 38 the Court ex-
plained that the analysis must proceed further before per se liability
could be found: "Only if patients are forced to purchase [the tied anes-
thesiological] services as a result of the hospital's market power would
the arrangement have anticompetitive consequences. ' 39 Thus, coercion
is relevant only as an element that must be shown to find illegality per se,
and this illegality is based on economic considerations. Also, the "for-
cing" that constitutes coercion in the relevant sense can only arise when
31. 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
32. Id. at 1554-55.
33. Id. at 1554.
34. The Court of Appeals found the tying arrangement illegal on this basis. Id. at 1556.
35. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 513 F. Supp. 532, 543-44 (E.D. La. 1981).
36. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d. 286, 292-95 (5th Cir. 1982).
37. 104 S. Ct. at 1566-67. The Court also held that the plaintiff could not prevail in the
absence of per se illegality, because there was insufficient evidence that this particular contract
unreasonably restrained competition. Id. at 1567-69.
38. Id. at 1561-65; see supra notes 9-10 & accompanying text.
39. 104 S. Ct. at 1565.
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the seller has market power in the tying product market. 4°
Four justices, while concurring in the result in Jefferson Parish Hos-
pital, called for the abandonment of the per se rule against tying arrange-
ments. In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, they argued that the current
"elaborate inquiry into the economic effects of the tying arrangement" is
more appropriate to a rule of reason analysis, which more accurately as-
sesses the economic impact of a given tie-in.
41
The Court's distrust of tying arrangements, based on economic ob-
jections and alleged anticompetitive effects, may be misplaced. Many
economists and antitrust lawyers have long questioned the plausibility of
the Court's economic theories concerning tie-ins and have urged a rule of
reason approach. As evidenced by the split in the Jefferson Parish Hospi-
tal case, the Court soon may be ready to heed this call. For this reason, a
reconsideration of various economic critiques is in order.
Economic Analysis of Tying Arrangements
Because the Court's treatment of tying arrangements usually focuses
chiefly on the foreclosure objection, economic criticism of the Court's
treatment is most often directed at this theory. The other theories, how-
ever, have not gone uncriticized.
Coercion of consumers is rarely addressed by economists as an in-
dependent objection to tying arrangements. Perhaps this is because the
Court has only occasionally articulated the coercion issue as an in-
dependent consideration. 42 More likely it is because economists tend to
40. The Court dismissed the argument that "market imperfections" other than market
power resulted in the necessary kind of coercion. Id. at 1566-67.
41. Justice O'Connor wrote:
The Court has never been willing to say of tying arrangements ... that they are
always illegal, without proof of market power or anticompetitive effect.
The "per se" doctrine in tying cases has thus always required an elaborate in-
quiry into the economic effects of the tying arrangement. As a result, the tying doc-
trine incurs the costs of a rule of reason approach without achieving its benefits: the
doctrine calls for the extensive and time-consuming economic analysis characteristic
of the rule of reason, but then may be interpreted to prohibit arrangements that
economic analysis would show to be beneficial. Moreover, the per se label in the
tying context has generated more confusion than coherent law because it appears to
invite lower courts to omit the analysis of economic circumstances of the tie that has
always been a necessary element of tying analysis.
The time has therefore come to abandon the "per se" label and refocus the in-
quiry on the adverse economic effects, and the potential economic benefits, that the
tie may have .... This change will rationalize rather than abandon tie-in doctrine
as it is already applied.
Id. at 1570 (footnote omitted).
42. See supra notes 30-31 & accompanying text.
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downplay power relationships in voluntary contracts, viewing tying ar-
rangements merely as "equivalent to a price increase in many cases" and
the focus on consumer choice as "misdirected and misleading."
43
The barriers to entry theory has been criticized on several grounds.
Some economists believe that if capital markets are efficient, then a firm
can use tying arrangments to deter entry only if such arrangements entail
lower costs.44 Then the tying arrangement may well be socially
desirable.
Another criticism of the theory has been that entry into the tied
product market by a lower-cost manufacturer would not be deterred by
the tie-in arrangement. In that event, the tying product monopolist
would be inclined to buy the tied product from the lower cost manufac-
turer and to resell it to the tie-in buyer. If the monopolist, in an effort to
impede entry into the tying product market, refuses to buy and resell the
tied product to the tie-in buyer, the existence of competitors in the tied
product market generally will inhibit the success of the tying strategy.
45
As the preceding legal analysis indicates, the Court has viewed tying
arrangements primarily, and at times exclusively, as a lever for extending
market power from one market to another. In contrast, many econo-
mists view leverage as rarely or never a plausible motive for tie-ins. 46 At
least one prominent commentator has argued that a tying product mo-
nopolist has no incentive to monopolize a complementary product mar-
ket.47 Because the products are used in conjunction with one another, he
argues the maximum monopoly profits available can be extracted from a
single monopoly position.48 Many economists have argued that price
discrimination is the primary motivation for tie-ins.
49
43. Blair & Finci, supra note 30, at 555; see also supra note 55.
44. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 310 (1978).
45. R. POSNER, supra note 9, at 176.
46. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 44, at 365-81; Smaistrla, An Analysis of Tying Arrange-
ments: Invalidating the Leveraging Hypothesis, 61 TEx. L. REv. 893 (1982).
47. Complementarity of products is defined supra note 9. A more technical definition is
given infra note 58. Tying arrangements involving complementary products are the most com-
mon type and have the most potential for involving leverage. See infra notes 82-85 & accom-
panying text.
Note that this criticism also undermines the foreclosure theory. See id..
48. R. POSNER, supra note 9, at 173-74. Profits could be increased if the monopolist were
acquiring the second monopoly in order to price discriminate. Id. This use of a tying arrange-
ment, however, has nothing to do with monopoly extension. See infra notes 65-66 & accompa-
nying text.
49. See Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 20
(1957); Burstein, The Economics of Tie-in Sales, 42 REv. ECON. & STAT. 68 (1960) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Burstein, Tie-in Sales]; Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L. REV.
62 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Burstein, Full-Line Forcing]. For a discussion of why the re-
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It is necessary at this point to distinguish between two possible
senses in which one might use the term "leverage." 50 A revenue-maxi-
mizing device, which is only a means of better utilizing existing market
power to increase profits, might be called a leverage device. Price dis-
crimination is a good example of this type of behavior. 5 1 The term "lev-
erage" may also be used to describe a monopoly-creating, or monopoly-
extending, device which actually increases the amount of monopoly
power in some way. 52 It is this latter sense of leverage with which the
Court's foreclosure theory of tying arrangements is concerned: the
Court's treatment assumes that monopoly power can be created or ex-
tended by tying. 53 For this reason, and unless otherwise indicated, we
placement of leverage theory by price discrimination theory has failed to have a discernible
impact on public policy, see R. POSNER, supra note 9, at 174-77. Economists have more re-
cently identified several other reasons for the existence of tie-ins. See infra notes 69-70 &
accompanying text. See generally Edwards, The Economics of "Tying" Arrangements: Some
Proposed Guidelines for Bank Holding-Company Regulation, 6 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV.
87 (1973); Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Class Actions, 36 VAND. L. REV. 213, 227-59
(1983).
50. The distinction appears in an influential article by Professor Bowman. See Bowman,
supra note 49, at 19.
51. Considering tie-ins as a form of price discrimination rather than as a monopoly-creat-
ing device does not automatically establish that they ought to be permitted. R. POSNER, supra
note 9, at 177-80.
52. Many economists argue that tie-ins rarely can be used as a monopoly-creating device.
See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 44, at 365-81; R. POSNER, supra note 9, at 171-84; Baldwin &
McFarland, Tying Arrangements in Law and Economics, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 743, 766, 778
(1963); Bowman, supra note 49; Burstein, Tie-in Sales, supra note 49.
53. In practice, the Court has had difficulty making this distinction. For example, the
Court's initial adoption of the monopoly extension argument involved the use of a tying ar-
rangement to capture monopoly profits on the patented tying product. In Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), the Court refused to enforce a
contract clause that required movie exhibitors to use patented movie projectors manufactured
by the licensor of the movies. The Court reasoned that to allow a movie projector patentee to
tie movies would "create a monopoly in the manufacture and use of moving picture films." Id.
at 518. Such restrictions were held unenforceable under the patent laws and the Clayton Act.
The plaintiff had argued that the tie enabled it to earn its patent profit from the film rather
than from the patented projectors, i.e., that tying was revenue-maximizing rather than monop-
oly-creating. Id. at 516-17. The Court, however, viewed this defense as further evidence of the
patentee's monopoly extension.
The Court may now be ready to make this distinction. In Jefferson Parish Hospital, Jus-
tice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated:
[T]he law draws a distinction between the exploitation of market power by merely
enhancing the price of the tying product, on the one hand, and by attempting to
impose restraints on competition in the market for a tied product, on the other.
When the seller's power is just used to maximize its return in the tying product market,
where presumably its product enjoys some justifiable advantage over its competitors,
the competitive ideal of the Sherman Act is not necessarily compromised. But if that
power is used to impair competition on the merits in another market, a potentially
inferior product may be insulated from competitive pressures.
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will use the term leverage in this way, that is, tying for leverage is an
attempt to extend monopoly power. 54 In assessing the plausibility of the
Court's foreclosure theory, the question is whether leverage can be ac-
complished by the use of a tying arrangement.
Economic concern with the alleged monopoly-creating aspects of ty-
ing is necessarily related to the more general economic problem of mar-
ket power. 55 Market power exists when a firm can raise the price of its
104 S. Ct. at 1559 (emphasis added).
54. Professors Areeda and Turner define "leverage" as "a supplier's power to induce his
customer for one product to buy a second product from him that would not otherwise be
purchased solely on the merit of that second product." P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAW % 1134a (1980). This definition clearly relates to the coercive aspects of tie-ins; in
the analysis in the text that follows, we define leverage in a way that goes to the heart of
economic analysis-the allocation of resources-and that is less concerned with the power
relationships between buyers and sellers.
55. Leverage, or monopoly power in general, is an important issue in tying arrangements
because it is related to the efficient allocation of resources. Monopoly is inefficient if it causes
too little output to be produced at too high a price, Le., society's resources are under-allocated
to the production of the monopolist's output. To demonstrate the concept of allocative effi-
ciency, assume that the value consumers place on each unit of good A is reflected by the
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For example, the value of the 10th unit produced is $4. Let the cost per unit of producing A
be constant at $4 as represented on the graph by the cost curve CA . The perfectly competitive
output is 10 units, which is alloeatively efficient because the value to society of the last unit
produced ($4) is exactly equal to the cost of the resources used to produce that unit. If a tying
arrangement created leverage that allowed the firm to gain some monopoly power and thus
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product without losing all of its sales. Because a firm with market power,
such as a monopolist, faces a downward sloping demand curve, 56 price
can only be increased by restricting output relative to what a perfectly
competitive market would produce. 57 Thus, if the monopolist produces
good A and ties it to good B, which is produced in a competitive market,
leverage can be said to occur in market B only if tying causes the total
amount of B sold to decrease. To illustrate, let B* be the amount of B
sold in a perfectly competitive equilibrium before any tying occurs; let
Bm be the amount of B tied to good A and sold by the monopolist, and let
Bc be the amount of B sold by competitive firms after the monopolist in
A has made the tie-in. The monopolist has leverage if and only if the
total amount of B sold after tying is less than the total amount sold
before tying, i.e., if Bm + B, < B*.
In determining whether leverage can be accomplished through tying
arrangements, we will now distinguish among several economic situa-
tions in which tying might occur and identify the economic motives for
tying that operate in each situation. We distinguish between goods that
are independent in demand, such as salt and coffee, the price of one hav-
ing no noticeable effect on the demand for the other, and goods with
interdependent demands, such as punch cards and card reading ma-
chines, the demand for one being closely related to the price of the
other.58 It will also be important to distinguish between cases in which
decrease the output of A by two units without a competitor being able to replace those two
units, then total output would be 8 units and the price would be $6. Because the value to
society of the ninth unit is shown by the demand curve to be $5 and the cost of producing that
unit is only $4, efficiency dictates that the ninth (and tenth) units should be produced. The
monopolist's failure to produce those units is said to be allocatively inefficient; it is producing
too little output in order to obtain a higher price. The question of allocative efficiency centers
not on the price charged, but rather on the total output produced in the market. Therefore,
total output is the criterion by which we will judge tying arrangements to determine whether
or not leverage exists; leverage exists if output after a tie-in is less than output that would be
produced in a competitive market.
Using the same notion of allocative efficiency, the legal concepts of foreclosure and coer-
cion are economically important only to the extent that output is affected. For example, if
foreclosure only means that a given amount of a product is produced by firm 2 instead of firm
1, then allocative efficiency is not affected, because total output has not changed. (This as-
sumes that both firms would produce the good at the same cost.) Similarly, coercion to buy a
product that consumers do not desire, or which they desire to buy from another vendor, only
affects allocative efficiency to the extent that total output is affected.
56. Downward sloping demand means that price and quantity are inversely related; when
price increases the amount demanded will decrease, and when a firm increases output, the only
way that output can be sold is by lowering price. In contrast, a perfectly competitive firm faces
a horizontal demand curve. See infra note 59.
57. See supra note 55.
58. Demand dependence can be defined in terms of the cross-price elasticity of demand
-IA,B which is defined as
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goods are tied in fixed proportions, where one unit of A is tied to a con-
stant quantity of B, and cases in which goods are tied in variable propor-
tions, where different consumers may use differing amounts of B with a
single unit of A.
Tying When Goods Have Independent Demands
Let us begin by examining the reasoning behind the leverage argu-
ment in the simplest case of goods with independent demands and fixed
proportion tying. The argument maintains that if a monopolistic pro-
ducer of product A ties the purchase of A to the purchase of product B,
which is sold in a competitive market, and also raises the price of B and
then sells a positive amount of B, the firm must have gained some mo-
nopoly power in market B. If a competitive firm were to raise the price
of B, all of its customers would abandon it for lower priced sellers; be-
cause this does not happen to the monopolist, leverage is assumed.
In fact, when goods having independent demands are sold in fixed
proportions, leverage cannot occur for the following reasons: The firm, a
monopolist in market A, faces a demand for A, depicted by DA in Figure
1, that is downward sloping. Because market B is competitive, however,
the firm faces a horizontal demand curve at the market price PB of $2. 59
If the monopolist tied one unit of B to one unit of A, and charged a price
of $4 for A and $3 for B, the total sales would be exactly the same as if it
charged $5 for A and $2 for B. The effective price of the bundle is $7 in
either case. Because consumers can always buy B for $2, they will sub-
tract $2 from the price of A + B and purchase the bundle only if good A
is worth at least $5 to them. Thus, when A and B are tied, raising the
price charged for B effectively is equivalent to raising the price of A.
60
%AA AA PB
1AB -- %APB APa  A
and measures the effect of a change in the price of good B on the demand for good A. Thus, if
'A.B = 0 the demands are independent; ifqAB = 0, the demands are interdependent. Specifi-
cally, if'qA.B > 0 the goods are said to be substitutes and if q1A,B < 0 the goods are said to be
complements.
59. A horizontal demand implies that the firm cannot affect the market price by manipu-
lating its own output. Because of the availability of products from other competitive firms that
consumers regard as perfect substitutes, an output reduction by one firm will neither decrease
the overall supply nor increase the market price.
60. See generally Pearson, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw. U.L. REv.
626, 632-34 (1965). Accordingly, DA+B, the demand for the tied bundle A + B in Figure 1,
will be the vertical sum of DA and DB. This result presumes that every consumer would have
purchased at least one unit of good B at PB = $2. If this were not true, then the total quantity
demanded of B might rise, but certainly would not fall.
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The availability of B at $2 from other sources guarantees that the tying
arrangement cannot raise the effective price of B. Changes in the price of
the bundle of goods can only affect the effective price and the quantity
demanded of good A; the total amount of B sold will not change. Hence,
there is no leverage.
If, as the above analysis indicates, tying does not facilitate the exten-
Figure 1
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sion of monopoly power when goods have independent demands, why
would tying occur in this context? Perhaps because it facilitates "lever-
age" in its other sense, that is, tying may be a revenue-maximizing device
for better utilization of existing market power to increase profits.6 1 But
price discrimination is the usual device to accomplish this type of "lever-
age,"' 62 and commentators have shown that tying generally is not a profit-
able means of price discrimination when demands are independent. 63 An
exception to this general rule occurs, however, when a monopolist is able
to use a tying arrangement to present the consumer with an all-or-noth-
ing offer.64 In this case, tying may increase profits from existing monop-
oly power through price discrimination; however, it still will not result in
leverage, that is, the transfer of monopoly power to the tied product
market.
The all-or-nothing offer is illustrated in Figure 2, showing the de-
mand curve of a particular consumer of good A' which is produced by a
monopolist. If the monopolist charges price P., the consumer will buy
A' units. The market value for these units is defined by the area CBA'O
under the demand curve.65 The consumer's total expenditures for A
equal P X A', which can be represented as PBA'O on the graph. The
difference between what the consumer thinks A' is worth and what he
actually has to pay for it is the triangle CBPj. The area of this triangle is
called "consumer surplus." Assume Pj = $11, A' = 20 units, and
CBP = $50; the consumer will spend 20 X 11 = $220 on A'. If we
assume that total value to the consumer of 20 units of A is $270, then
consumer surplus is $50. If the monopolist can force the consumer to
choose between 20 units of A for $269 or none at all, the consumer
would accept this "all-or-nothing" offer and the monopolist would cap-
ture all but $1 of the consumer surplus as profit.
66
61. See supra notes 50-51 & accompanying text. The point here is that the monopolist
may be able to increase profits from sales of A over what they would be under single monopoly
pricing. See infra note 67.
62. This is using "leverage" in the profit-maximizing sense.
63. See Schmalensee, Commodity Bundling by a Single-Product Monopolist, 25 J.L. &
ECON. 67 (1982); Smaistrla, supra note 48, at 915-17. Schmalensee shows that when demand is
independent and there are fixed proportions, tying will be less profitable than selling the prod-
ucts separately. He does find that "mixed bundling," selling good x at price px, good y at price
py, and the bundle at a price Pb < Px + Py is a profitable type of price discrimination, but this
resembles nonlinear pricing (with fixed proportions), see infra notes 86-119 & accompanying
text, more than tying.
64. This is the situation described in detail by Burstein, Tie-in Sales, supra note 49.
65. This definition assumes that there are no income effects.
66. Smaistrla has correctly pointed out that actually making a tying agreement into an
all-or-nothing offer is quite difficult, and if the decision of how many units of good A to buy is
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Figure 2
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The consumer surplus that cannot be extracted by simply raising the
price of good A can in principle be captured by the all-or-nothing offer.
6 7
Suppose the consumer, whose demand for A is depicted in Figure 2, is
planning to purchase exactly one unit of good B at the competitive price
(PB*) of $30 and that the per unit cost of B is also $30. Assume the
monopolist ties the two goods so that A cannot be purchased without
purchasing B, continues to charge $11 for A, but charges $40 for B, a
affected by the tie-in, as it would be if the consumer had to purchase some fixed proportion of
good B with each unit of A, then this analysis no longer holds. Smaistrla, supra note 48, at
916.
67. Note that when the firm charged a price of P = $11, without the all-or-nothing
offer, revenues were 20 X $11 = $220. If the firm raised the price to $12, then the quantity
sold would fall to 16 units--due to the downward sloping demand-and revenues would fall to
16 X $12 = $192. Clearly, the $270 of consumer surplus cannot be captured in this manner.
Under some circumstances, however, this surplus-or at least part of it-can be captured by
tying as explained in the text.
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price that is $10 higher than the competitive price. The consumer will
still purchase one unit of B and 20 units of A because the total price for
the package does not exceed the total value the consumer attaches to it:
220 + 40 < 270 + 30. The extra $10 paid for good B is just the price
the consumer is willing to pay to have the opportunity to buy good A.
After subtracting the cost of good B, the monopolist will net $230. In this
way the tie-in is used to extract $10 worth of consumer surplus available
in market A. It is important to keep in mind that the quantity of good B
purchased has not changed, so leverage has not occurred. All that has
happened is that the monopolist has used the tie-in to better utilize ex-
isting market power over good A.
68
There are also some special cases in which it will be profitable to tie
goods that are independent in demand; for example, if governmental
price controls on the monopolized tying good artificially hold down its
price.69 The tied good is sold at a price above the competitive price, but
the quantity sold does not decrease. Consumers, willing to pay more for
the tying good than they were paying before the tie-in, also are willing to
pay more for the package. This arrangement has nothing to do with
leverage; it only serves to extract monopoly profits available for the tying
good, and there is no decrease in the total quantity of the tied product
sold.7
0
Thus, tying goods with independent demands, in fixed proportions,
does not result in leverage in the relevant sense of extending monopoly
power into another product market. In some cases, however, it may
serve to enhance a monopolist's ability to extract the profits available due
to an existing monopoly. Some have suggested that tying in this context
may also be used to monitor collusive agreements among oligopolists, but
this also has nothing to do with leverage.
71
68. Interestingly, this type of tie-in is economically equivalent to a two-part tariff in
which a consumer pays an entry fee-in this case the price of good B-before purchases of
good A can be made at price PA per unit. Two-part tariffs are a form of price discrimination.
See Oi, A Disneyland Dilemma: Two Part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly, 85 Q.J. ECON.
77 (1971); see also Burstein, Tie-in Sales, supra note 49 (showing that these tie-ins are a means
of price discrimination).
69. See, e.g., Coffin-Redington Co. v. Porter, 156 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1946); see also F.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 583 (2d ed.
1980). It is unlikely that a court would accept such a business justification. For a discussion of
the inherent conflict between government regulations and antitrust, see Easterbrook, Antitrust
and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23 (1983).
70. See Smaistrla, supra note 48, at 912 (identifying another case in which a firm used a
tie-in to exercise indirectly its monopoly of a patented good).
71. See Cummings & Ruhter, The Northern Pacific Case, 22 J.L. & ECON. 329 (1979);
Peterman, The International Salt Case, 22 J.L. & EcON. 351 (1979). The relation to monopoly
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So far, we have considered only goods that are tied in fixed propor-
tions. In contrast, if good A can be tied to varying amounts of good B,
then an increase in the price of good B will affect the consumer's decision
about how much of B to consume. For example, if coffee were tied to
salt and the price of coffee increased over the competitive price, then the
tie-in might operate as a form of price discrimination in the way de-
scribed above,72 but it would also cause the consumer to purchase less
coffee because the effective price per pound is higher. In this case, lever-
age has occurred. It is incidental, however, to the main goal of price
discrimination, and the net effect on welfare is ambiguous and may even
be positive if the price of good A is lower.
73
Tying When Goods Have Interdependent Demands
When products with interdependent demands are tied in variable
proportions, there are several possible explanations for tying. Such tying
often occurs when two complementary products are sold together under
a requirements contract in which a variable quantity of the tied good is
purchased along with one unit of the tying good. The quantity of the tied
good that the buyer requires, and therefore purchases, varies with the
intensity of his use of the tying good.
Most explanations for tying in this context center around the con-
cept of "metering." When consumers differ in the amount of the tied
good they combine with the tying product, each consumer's intensity of
consumption is metered by the tie-in. The most common explanation of
these tying arrangements is that the seller is engaging in price discrimina-
tion. Those who consume large quantities of the tied good may have a
lower elasticity of demand for the tying golod than do consumers who use
less of the tied good.74 If this is so, then the monopolist may want to
charge heavy users a higher overall price for the tied good. This is ac-
complished by selling the tying good at a relatively low price and the tied
good substantially above the price at which it would be sold in a competi-
tive market. Low intensity users, who consume less of the tied product,
will still purchase the package. The monopolist can retain these sales,
while extracting larger profits from high intensity users who are, in effect,
power is that the tie-in helps promote collusion where firms have jointly restricted output in
order to raise price.
72. See supra notes 64-68 & accompanying text.
73. That is, the benefits from a lower price for good A may more than offset any losses
from a higher price for good B.
74. For a discussion of elasticity of demand and price discrimination, see F. SCHERER,
supra note 69, at 315.
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paying more for the package than low intensity users.75
International Business Machines v. United States76 involved a classic
example of this use of a tying arrangement. Computers, the monopolized
tying product, were rented at a relatively low price, and tabulating cards,
the tied product, were sold at a substantial markup above marginal cost.
In effect, the above-normal profits earned in the tied product market
were the result of monopolistic price discrimination in the tying product
market.77 Another example of this type of tying arrangement is
presented by Blackstone78 in a discussion of the market for electrofax
copiers. Copiers were leased at a relatively low price while supplies, such
as paper and chemicals, which were tied to copiers, were priced at a sub-
stantial markup over cost.
Recently, two other explanations for metering arrangements have
been advanced. Hansen and Roberts79 argue that if a leased tying good is
durable and if its rate of depreciation depends on the intensity of its use,
then the additional cost imposed by high intensity users may justify their
paying a higher price than is paid by low intensity users. They argue that
in this context tying is simply a way to measure the actual services per-
formed by the durable good and may therefore be an efficient form of
pricing.80 Alternatively, Liebowitz argues that metered tie-ins are a form
75. For example, assume the constant average cost of product A is $100 and it is sold at a
10% markup, so that its price is $110. The constant average cost of B is $1 and it is marked up
100%, so that its price is $2. Now consider two customers: Customer 1 buys A and over its
lifetime uses 1000 units of B, whereas customer 2 buys A but will use only 100 units of B. The
total, undiscounted expenditures by customer I will be $1 10+ 1000($2)=$2110. The cost of
supplying this buyer will be $100+ 1000($1)= $1 100. Similarly, customer 2's expenditure will
be $110 + 100($20) = $310 and the producer's cost will be $100 + 100($1) = $200. The
price-cost ratio for customer 1 will be 1.918, which is substantially higher than customer 2's
ratio of 1.55. This difference constitutes price discrimination.
76. 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
77. Whether leverage is manifest in a reduction in total output for the tied product is not
clear. See infra notes 84-85 & accompanying text.
78. Blackstone, Restrictive Practices in the Marketing of Electrofax Copying Machines and
Supplies: The SCM Corporation Case, 23 J. INDUS. ECON. 189 (1975).
79. Hansen & Roberts, Metered Tying Arrangements, Allocative Efficiency and Price Dis-
crimination, 47 S. EcON. J. 73 (1980).
80. Id. at 78. Another commentator has pointed out that metered tie-ins, because of their
ability to reduce the mechanical costs of metering, are likely to be allocatively efficient. The
increased profits resulting from this efficiency should not be used as evidence of a Clayton Act
violation. Markovits, Tie-Ins and Reciprocity: A Functional, Legal, and Policy Analysis, 58
TEX. L. REv. 1363, 1429 (1980). Other commentators have suggested that tie-ins are used
because the seller may fear that the purchaser will cheat and underreport the intensity of use of
the tying product. See Burstein, Tie-In Sales, supra note 49, at 69-72; see also Ferguson, Tying
Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 552, 555-
56 (1965).
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of risk sharing that may improve market efficiency. 81 Suppose the inten-
sity of use of the durable tying product, and thus the amount used of the
tying product, varies directly with demand for the final product which
the consumer produces using the tying product; then a metered tie-in
with a low price for the durable product and a high price for the variable-
use component, the tied product, will produce higher total expenditures
for the package during periods of intense demand for the final product
and lower expenditures when demand is slack.82 The purchaser of a du-
rable good who is risk averse 83 may be willing to pay the supplier of the
durable good a premium to share in the risk resulting from this variable
demand.
Notwithstanding these other explanations for tying goods with in-
terdependent demands, we need to consider whether leverage occurs in
this context. We will concentrate on the typical situation, one in which
the goods tied are complementary. 84 If two goods are complements, then
81. See Liebowitz, Tie-in Sales and Price Discrimination, 21 EcON. INQUIRY 387 (1983).
82. Liebeler has developed the same analysis and applied it to United States v. American
Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1949). In American Can, the government attacked Ameri-
can's below-cost leases of can-closing machines that had been tied to requirements contracts
for cans. Liebeler offered the following analysis:
The American Can arrangements seem designed to create efficiency, however, by
shifting risk from the packers to the can producers. One risk shifted is that of bear-
ing the capital cost of an expensive can closing machine in a season of short crops,
when it will be little used. If payment for the machine is through the purchase of
cans, lower payments will be made in a lean year. Payments will be made up when
crops are good and many cans are bought. The can producers appear to be able to
deal with the risk of crop fluctuations more cheaply than individual packers because
the former typically will cover wider geographic areas and broader crop lines than
the latter. The diversity in yields as between different areas and different crops
makes this "insurance" scheme feasible to the can producers.
Liebeler, Book Review, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1317, 1320 (1978) (reviewing R. BORK, THE ANTI-
TRUST PARODOX (1978)). Liebeler states that his analysis of American Can is not original, and
he cites United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. Supp. 859, 896 (D. Md. 1916), appeal
dismissed, 256 U.S. 706 (1921). It is also interesting to note that Smaistrla cites American Can
as an example of the Hansen & Roberts model. See Smaistrla, supra note 48, at 922. Thus, the
Liebowitz/Liebeler analysis and the Hansen & Roberts analysis may be complementary.
83. Risk aversion means that the firm will be willing to pay a premium over the expected
value of a loss to insure against that loss. In this case, there is uncertainty regarding the future
profit stream, and a risk averse manager will be willing to accept lower profits if they are less
variable.
84. See supra note 58 for a definition of complementarity. An example of complementary
products would be bread and butter: when the price of bread rises, the quantity demanded of
bread falls and less butter is demanded for use on the bread, thus the demand for butter varies
inversely with the price of bread.
It is conceivable that substitutes might have interdependent demands and be tied. An
example of tying substitutes is described in Barzel, Competitive Tying Arrangements: The Case
of Medical Insurance, 19 ECON. INQUIRY 598 (1981). Insurance packages tie together services
which are substitutes so that an insured patient can use the lowest cost services. If one of the
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an increase in the price of one good will decrease the demand for the
other good. A firm tying both products must consider this interdepen-
dence in choosing the profit maximizing price. If, for example, the price
of A is decreased and the price of B is increased relative to what they
would be without tying, the net effect is ambiguous: decreasing the price
of A increases the demand for B (due to complementarity), while increas-
ing the price of B decreases the demand for B. Whether the total amount
of B increases or decreases, that is, whether leverage has occurred, is
unclear. It appears that any leverage existing in the market for the tied
good is "purchased" by a decrease in the price of the tying good. Thus,
even if a tie-in results in leverage, it does not necessarily have a net anti-
competitive effect. But it is inaccurate to say that there is no leverage in
tie-ins and that there are no anti-competitive effects associated with tying
arrangements.
85
Profitable Alternatives to Tying
An Introduction to Nonlinear Payment Schedules
In the preceding section, we demonstrated that while leverage may
exist in some circumstances, tying probably occurs for reasons uncon-
nected with leverage, such as price discrimination. Indeed, many econo-
mists have identified price discrimination by metering as the key
motivation for tying.86 We also pointed out some nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for tying.8 7 Having made these points, we now intend to show that
services were not insured, the patient would always use the insured service, even if it were
more costly (to the insurer). This is a type of adverse selection which can be prevented by the
tying arrangement.
One commentator claims that leverage occurs only when goods are complements:
When product complementarity is involved, the higher price charged for product B
[tied product] is not a substituted means of charging for product A [tying product].
On the contrary, output of product B for use with product A is less than any output
of product B for such use which would exist by manipulation of the price or output
of product A when product B is competitive. In other words, the result of the tie-in
is to create the equivalent of another monopoly, a monopoly over product B for use
with product A. The tie-in thus yields the equivalent of monopoly by a single seller
over both A and B. . . . Leverage is present; and the tie-in provides the leverage,
since the price and output of one product will necessarily affect the price and output
of the other.
Bowman, supra note 49, at 25-26 (footnotes omitted). Telser, however, argues that the sole
purpose of the tie-in is price discrimination. See Telser, A Theory of Monopoly of Complemen-
tary Goods, 52 J. Bus. 211 (1979). It is not clear, however, that Telser's definition of leverage
is consistent with the one given above. For a summary of Telser's analysis, see Smaistrla,
supra note 48, at 923-25.
85. Some writers have made this claim. See, e.g., Smaistrla, supra note 48, at 927.
86. See supra notes 74-78 & accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 79-83 & accompanying text.
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even if leverage were a problem associated with tying arrangements, the
Court's attempt to improve market performance by outlawing tie-ins is
ineffective. The prohibition is ineffective because, at least with regard to
complementary goods with variable proportions-the most common
context in which tying arrangements arise and also the case most likely
to result in leverage-a pricing strategy is available that is economically
very similar to tie-ins, yet is perfectly legal.
We focus our attention on the situations in which commodities must
be consumed with a positive quantity of a complementary product and
the amount of the complement tied to the basic (tying) product depends
on consumer preferences. The antitrust cases on tying illustrate numer-
ous product relationships of this sort.8 8 In nearly all cases the comple-
mentary requirement is available in a competitive market. Reducing the
economic issues to their simplest level, controversy arises because a mo-
nopolist seeks to exert control over the competitive price of a comple-
mentary requirement by making the sale of its basic product conditional
on the purchase of all the buyer's requirements for the complement from
the monopolist.
In this section, we hypothesize a monopolist that charges a competi-
tive price for the complement, but at the same time presents consumers
with an alternative payment plan that ties (or bundles) the two goods in
such a way that consumers decide how much of the complement they
take with a basic product. We demonstrate that when buyers have a
choice between paying the competitive price for the complement and
paying one price for a package that combines the monopolized product
with an amount of the complementary requirement specified by the con-
sumer, the monopolist's profits frequently increase. Furthermore, by as-
signing specific algebraic forms to the demand function, we can show
that profits closely approximate and may even exceed those earned from
tying.
This kind of packaging or "bundling" strategy is common. Exam-
ples of it include the offer of an open maintenance agreement with the
purchase of a durable good,89 the provision of an "unlimited" number of
88. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (salt processing
machines and rock salt); IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (computing machines and
punch cards).
89. Curtomers are frequently given the option of paying for repairs as they come up or
purchasing an extended warranty contract that obligates the dealer to make all repairs over a
specified period of time. Hence, all of the repairs a car requires are provided at one price.
Maintenance on new household appliances such as refrigerators, dishwashers, and washing
machines are also presented in such a way that the consumer has the option of buying repairs
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checks with a bank account, and free delivery with any purchase.90
Whenever consumers are given a nontrivial choice between payment
plans, a nonlinear payment schedule is generated.
In order to understand nonlinear payment schedules, one must first
consider linear payment schedules. Suppose consumers can be indexed
by the amount of the complementary requirement they demand with one
unit of the monopolized produict. Let r be the consumer preference in-
dex representing one group of buyers who have the same demand curve
for the requirement. Consumers can be characterized by the index as
demanding from as little as none of the requirement to as much as some
arbitrary amount we call R.91 If all consumer types pay the same prices
for the basic product and the necessary complement, a linear payment
schedule is generated, as shown in Figure 3.92 The total payment made
by a consumer depends upon how much of the requirement (r) he or she
takes with the basic product (x). The price of the requirement is Pr, and
Px is the price of the basic product. The ri consumer type pays p, + prri
for the package of one unit of x plus the amount of r the index type takes
with the product. The slope of the schedule is the price (pr) that consum-
ers must pay for each unit of the requirement regardless of how much
they take.
as they arise or obligating the dealer to make repairs for a fee packaged with the sale of the
appliance.
Additional examples of economically similar arrangements abound. Telephone compa-
nies offer to provide long distance telephone service on a price per minute basis, or charge one
price for unlimited calls (W.A.T.S.). Water utilities give consumers a choice between paying
for metered water consumption on a per gallon basis or paying one monthly charge for unlim-
ited consumption. Equipment rental agreements-office or construction machinery, for exam-
pie-are sometimes written with a charge per hour or per day, or the machinery can be leased
for longer periods at one fixed fee. In all these examples, consumers expecting to take large
quantities of the service or requirement pay the fixed charge. Those expecting to consume
small amounts select the per unit charge. In this way, large and small buyers are effectively
separated into two markets.
90. This type of bundling is much like the pure bundling strategy described in Adams &
Yellen, Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly, 90 Q.J. EcoN. 475, 478-79 (1976).
The difference is that Adams and Yellen considered bundles with fixed proportions. Our
model involves variable proportions; the content and, as a consequence, the cost of the bundle
changes across consumers. If, however, there is free disposal and all consumers take the maxi-
mum amount possible, then nonlinear bundling and pure bundling are the same since the
amount of the complementary requirement combined with the basic product is fixed. This
seems unlikely because disposal is costly.
91. That is, we assume 0 < ri < R.
92. A linear payment schedule is represented by a straight line. The straight line repre-
sents the function y = mx + b, where m is the slope and b is the y-intercept. In the immedi-
ately following text, m =Pr and b = p.-
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A nonlinear payment schedule can be created by changing the effec-
tive price of the basic product and requirement to some buyers. Suppose
the monopolist bundles as much of the requirement as a consumer
chooses to take with the basic product and sells the entire package at the
price Pb- Consumers then have a choice between buying product x bun-
dled with an indefinite amount of the requirement at a relatively high
price (Pb), or paying the going price for x (p.) and purchasing each unit
of the requirement at Pr .9 3 Assume also that no secondary trading or
"arbitrage" occurs.94
Figure 4 shows that this bundled offer changes the linear payment
schedule to a nonlinear schedule. Consumers, when given the choice,
locate on the lower portions of the intersecting payment schedules.
Those buyers with an index ri < ro (i.e., those who demand less of the
complement) continue to purchase the basic and complementary prod-
93. In these cases, and throughout the remainder of our economic discussion, there is an
implicit upper bound on the amount of requirement available, but it is essentially nonbinding
in our analysis.
94. That is, a customer does not elect to pay the price that gives him an "unlimited"
amount of the requirement and then sell the requirement to another buyer for a price less than
Pr" In the above examples this would be a difficult feat, but in some markets it represents a
serious threat to the success of a bundling strategy. If a computer company, for instance,
supplied its buyers with "free" tabulating cards, customers could easily resell the cards to
other computer users, competing with the company's individual card prices.
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ucts separately, while those with ri > r. (i.e., who demand more of the
complement) purchase the bundle. Thus the relevant portions of the two
payment schedules form a kinked or nonlinear payment schedule.95
Figure 4




The kind of pricing strategy described in Figure 4 can frequently be
more profitable than tying. The bundle is a tie-in arrangement of sorts;
indeed, anytime products are bundled there is some semblance of tying,
at least from an economic point of view. In this case, however, because
there is a choice between payment plans, there is no coercion to purchase
95. This description should be related to the rather extensive nonlinear price literature.
The parallel with this literature can be seen by thinking of a firm that prices the complement
competitively as setting a two-part tariff, where the fixed part of the tariff is the price of the
monopolized product. See supra note 68. Offering the basic product with unlimited quantities
of the complement as an alternative to pricing the two separately is the same as presenting
another tariff structure, except that after paying the fixed tax the charge per unit drops to zero.
The pricing strategy we have in mind may therefore be thought- of as combining a pair of two-
part tariffs. Viewed in this light, our work can be related to that of Leland & Meyer, Monopoly
Pricing Structures with Imperfect Discrimination, 8 BELL J. ECON. 449 (1976); Willig, Pareto
Superior Nonlinear Outlay Schedules, 9 BELL J. ECON. 56 (1978); and Faulhaber & Panzar,
Optimal Two-Part Tariffs with Self-Selection, Bell Laboratories Discussion Paper #74 (1977);
which explore the profitability and performance of nonlinear price schedules constructed by
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the bundle. 96 Moreover, the tie-in is very informal; consumers can spec-
ify, free of charge, how much of the requirement they choose to combine
with the basic product once the bundled price is paid. For these reasons,
the lack of coercion and the flexibility of the bundle's composition, we
argue later that courts should and probably would find the nonlinear
payment stategy legal.
97
Profit Maximizing Nonlinear Payment Schedules
In general, the profitability of presenting a bundled alternative de-
pends on the relative magnitudes of the own-price and cross-price elastic-
ities in the market. 98 The less elastic the demand is for the basic product
and the bundle, the more profitable will be this method of pricing. We
will show that, assuming a uniform distribution of consumers across the
index and the existence of linear demand curves for all buyer types, this
nonlinear schedule leads to profits that may even be greater than those
earned from tying.99 In other words, the profitability of illegal tie-ins can
be virtually duplicated by the less controversial pricing strategy outlined
here.
This linear demand model also can demonstrate that certain non-
linear schedules are preferred over linear schedules, not only by the
seller, but also by consumers. As a group, consumers favor having a
choice because those who buy the bundle will pay lower overall prices for
the basic good and the requirement, while those who do not buy the
bundle will be indifferent to the bundling alternative. When every mar-
ket participant either prefers or is indifferent to a new payment schedule,
the schedule is said to be Pareto superior. °° Generally, payment sched-
ules that give consumers a choice preferable to the prices they already
pay will be Pareto superior. After demonstrating the increased profit-
96. That is, there are reasonable alternatives available to the consumer. Even when this
degree of consumer sovereignty is present, however, there is always the possibility that the
economic concept of choice will differ from what is held to be coercive under the antitrust
laws. This prospect is discussed in analyzing the legality of this bundling strategy, infra at
notes 121-163 & accompanying text.
97. Id.
98. For a full and technical treatment of the problem, see Ormiston & Phillips, Nonlinear
Price Schedules and Tied Products (1984) (unpublished working paper on file with Depart-
ment of Economics, Texas A & M University, College Station, Texas 77843). See supra note
58 for the definition of elasticity.
99. Thus tying may not be undertaken to price discriminate or extend market power over
other products. For more discussion on the reasons for tying, see Liebowitz, supra note 81, at
387.
100. For a detailed discussion of Pareto optimality, see NG, WELFARE ECONOMICS (1980).
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ability of the bundling strategy suggested in Figure 4, we will show that
nonlinear Pareto superior schedules can be identified.
In this model, we assume that consumers are uniformly and contin-
uously distributed along the consumer preference index. We also assume
that each consumer type in the index combines a different, but fixed,
amount of the complementary product with each unit of the basic good;
thus, each consumer has a perfectly inelastic demand for the complemen-
tary requirement. 101 Finally, we assume that each buyer has a linear de-
mand curve for the basic product and the bundle. 102 The index does not
enter into the demand schedules for buyers of the bundle because they
are free to take as much of the complement as they desire after paying Pb.
Costs of each unit to the seller will be constant, 10 3 but the cost of provid-
ing the bundle1°4 will vary because consumers take different amounts of
the requirement.
We are now able to express the seller's profit, which is the difference
between total revenue and total cost.' 0 5 The producer of x does not have
any monopoly power in the market for r, so its price will tend to equal
marginal cost. Thus, when the basic product and its complement are
sold individually through linear pricing, profit to the monopolist will be
the monopoly profits from sales of the basic product plus the reasonable
return on investment from sales of the complement. 10 6 When x is bun-
dled with the complement, the profit function changes.107
101. The range of the demand elasticity necessary for the profitability of the pricing strat-
egy outlined here is more fully explained in Ormiston & Phillips, supra note 98. Perfectly
inelastic demand is a simplifying assumption that does not alter the general conclusion of the
analysis. Linear demand is also not a necessary condition. These assumptions are very com-
mon to the spatial economics literature. See, ag., M. GREENHUT, A THEORY OF THE FIRM IN
ECONOMIC SPACE (1971); Beckman, Spatial Price Policies Revisited, 8 BELL J. ECON. 619
(1976); Capozza & Van Order, A Generalized Model of Spatial Competition, 68 AM. ECON.
REv. 896, 898 (1978).
102. In Figure 4 we write these demand schedules in an extremely simple form. Each
schedule has a slope of-i and intersects the vertical (price) axis at 1. Algebraically we express
these linear schedules in the form:
xi = 1 - Px - Prri
b = I -pb.
103. For each unit of x the cost is cx and for each unit of r the cost is cr.
104. Cb = C + r icr.
105. For buyers who choose not to purchase the bundle, the seller's profit r for the ith
consumer type is
ari = pXx - cxX + prri - crri = X(px-cx) + ri(pr-cr)"
106. Profits to the monopolist from linear pricing rEL may be expressed, after substituting
the demand curve for x, as
IrL = (1-p.-ci) (px-c) •
107. If b is sold, profits ii1 are
,rb = b(pb-Cx-riCr) = ( 1 -Pb) (pb-cx-riC) •
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The goal of the firm is to maximize profits by selling x either sepa-
rately or in a bundle. The algebra necessary to derive the profit maximiz-
ing prices is rather involved,1 0 8 but the results are that a profit
maximizing firm should set prices for the bundle such that one half of the
customers will choose to pay the individual per unit prices, and the other






SR 5R R Index
2 8
Profit Maximizing Linear and Nonlinear Payment Schedules
108. Let D be the uniform distribution of buyers along the index. Then the firm seeks to
rc R
Max 7NL = DI (p.-c.) f0 (1-px-prr)dr + (1- Pb) fro(Pb-rc-cx)dr]
PxPb-
Necessary first order conditions for profit maximization are
a TN L r r0
5p- = -P (-x-prr)dr+(px-cx) f0 - ldr = 0 and
a1rNL R R
-_fr (pb-rCrcx)dr + (l-pb) fro ldr = 0.
We also have the condition that r = Pb-Px. These three equations in three unknowns lead to
the solutions stated infra note 109.
109. These prices would be
p. = (4-crR+4cx)/8,
Pb = (4+3crR+4cx)/8, and as a result
ro = R/2.
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egy 110 exceed those from the most profitable linear strategy by 12.5%.111
Figure 5 illustrates the relative positioning of the payment sched-
ules. The schedule with the intercept at p, is the most profitable schedule
without bundling. When a monopolist decides to offer the bundle at the
alternative price, the profit maximizing price of the bundle (pb), it simul-
taneously raises the profit maximizing price of the basic product (px).
Those consumers located to the left of 5R/8 would rather not have the
nonlinear strategy instituted because they unambiguously pay higher
prices. Only those consumers to the right of 5R/8 prefer having the
choice. Hence, the most profitable nonlinear schedule for the firm is not
Pareto superior to the most profitable linear schedule. However, we will
show at the end of this section that if the firm did not raise the individual
price of x, but held it fixed at p,, when the bundle was offered, profits
would still increase and the nonlinear schedule would be Pareto superior
because all consumers would be left either unharmed or preferring the
bundle.
Figure 5 facilitates an intuitive appreciation of why the nonlinear
price schedule is more profitable than a linear strategy. As r gets larger
for any consumer type, more of the requirement is combined with the
basic product. For any fixed p, and Pr, total expenditures on the product
This means that the payment schedules intersect in exactly the middle of the distribution of
customers.
110. With these prices, profits for the nonlinear strategy ITNL are
1 (w + 1cR2), where w = 2-2crR-4cx+2ci+2xcrR.
'TrNL = 8 T~ +
111. When a monopolist practices a linear selling strategy and prices the requirement at
marginal cost, the objective is to
R
Max IrL = D(p-c)f Ro(1-p,-pr)dr.
0
The necessary first order condition for profit maximization is
aITL R R
f (l - px -prr)dr+(pxy
- e ) fo- ldr = 0.
Solving this equation for p, yields
2+2cx-crR
P. = 4
Substituting this price back into the profit function lrL yields the profits
1 12 2R.
L = (w + T'crR).
By looking at the expressions for IrNL and ITL it is easily observed that TrNL > TL (Le., 15/24
> 12/24).
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and requirement also increase, and the elasticity of demand increases. " 2
Hence, as we move along the r index, consumers have increasingly more
elastic demand schedules. A profit maximizer knows it can increase reve-
nue by charging a relatively low price to buyers with high elasticities and
a high price to buyers with a low demand elasticity.' 1 3 This is exactly
what happens when nonlinear prices are set as in Figure 5. Buyers who
purchase 5R/8 or less of the complement pay higher prices than under
the linear schedule (p, + prri), and those who purchase more than 5R/8
units of the requirement-consumers with a higher elasticity of de-
mand-pay relatively lower prices than they would under the most prof-
itable linear schedule. Altering prices in this way has the effect of
increasing total revenue to the seller.
Let us now compare the profits earned from nonlinear pricing to the
maximum profits that can possibly be earned from tying, assuming the
monopolist is not constrained by the antitrust laws from tying the prod-
ucts. An upper limit on the profitability of a tying arrangement can be
found by simply assuming the firm has a monopoly in both markets. The
firm would not have to set the price of the requirement at the competitive
price. The profitability of behaving like an unconstrained monopolist in
both markets' 14 is greater than the profits earned under either of the lin-
112. Similar to the definition of cross-price elasticity supra note 88, the price elasticity of
demand for the basic product x is
Axi P.
Ap. xi
where the first term is the slope of the demand schedule x, = 1 -Px-Prr, and is easily ob-
served to be - 1. Substituting, we see that
--Px --Px
•qX =lx - =
xi 1 -Px-Pri
The last ratio shows that as ri increases, demand becomes more elastic.
113. This observation is the essence of any price discrimination strategy. Buyers with low
elasticities will purchase more units if and only if price is relatively low; buyers with high
elasticities will purchase even if price is relatively high. The profitability of charging high
prices to consumers with low elasticities of demand is seen especially well in third degree
discrimination. For an intermediate discussion, see S. MAURICE, 0. PHILLIPS, & C. FERGU-
SON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 417-21 (4th ed. 1982).
114. The profit function for a firm acting like a pure monopolist in both markets is
-rm = D[ fro[P-c +r(pr-Cr)](1-px-prr)dr+(1-pb) .fr(pb-rcr-cx)dr[ .
The function is general enough to allow a monopolist to price discriminate. Indeed, we shall
see that when it is maximized, the solution is commonly referred to as discriminatory pricing
since consumers only pay half of the true requirement cost. The firm maximizes this function
with respect to the variables Px, Pr, and Pb- After integrating, the necessary first order condi-
tions for profit maximization are
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ear or nonlinear strategies discussed so far. 115 It is important to note that
when the firm has complete control of both markets it is not in its best
interest to offer a bundle. The firm can maximize its total profits by
charging separate monopoly prices for each product.'1 6 Once again,
these profits represent an upper limit on the profits that may be earned
from tying.
The difference between these nonbundled profits in the case of com-
plete monopoly in both markets and the nonbundled profits when the
requirement market is competitive' 17 can be reduced by 75% when the
competitive requirement is bundled through the use of a noncoercive,
nonlinear pricing strategy.' 18 This reduction is a remarkable feat. A
aor r 2  r 2
- = r° - (Pr-cr)-ro(Px-cx)-Pxro-Pr 2 = 0,
ar r2  r 0
2  r03 r
3




2 -ro 2)+(-pb)(R-ro) = 08Pb2




Px-- 2 ,Pr = " and ro = R.
These prices can then be substituted into the above profit function to give the profitability arm
of an unconstrained monopolist in both markets:
1 162.
arm = i (W + L6C 2 R2).
Notice that buyers are only paying half the cost of the purchased requirement, so those buyers
who are consuming large amounts of the product are receiving relatively large discounts.
These are the buyer types who also have high elasticities of demand. See supra note 112.
115. Compare the unconstrained monopoly profits rm with the nonlinear pricing profits
arNL and the linear pricing profits rL. Note that 16/24 > 15/24 > 12/24. Thus,
arm> 'arNL > arL" l+c x  cr
116. Individual monopoly prices are set for the products at px -2 2 and Pr = -" See
supra note 114.
117.
cr2 R2 16 12 4Cr
2R 2
arm-afrL= 8 (2424) 192"
118. This difference is reduced to
cr2 R2 1 cr2 R2
rm - rNL - 8 (24- 192
The 75% reduction is demonstrated by noting that
C2R2 4cr2 R2
in,- is 25% of 102R
I101
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selling strategy that presumes no monopoly power whatsoever in the re-
quirement product market and lets consumers choose between payment
plans achieves nearly the same profitability earned by someone who is a
monopolist in both markets. Such a nonlinear strategy may be even more
profitable than a tie-in in the usual case. Thus, sellers may view this as
an attractive alternative to tying arrangements.
The last point we wish to make, in defense of such a bundling
stragegy, is that it is possible to construct a nonlinear price schedule that
is Pareto superior to a linear schedule. Returning to Figure 5, suppose
the producer offered to sell the basic product at p, and also sold a bun-
dled product at Pb as shown in the diagram. Those consumers to the
right of r. (i.e., those with an index value r > 5R/8 in Figure 5) will
choose to buy the bundle and are better off by having this alternative
method of payment. The buyers to the left of r= 5R/8 are faced with the
same linear price schedule as before and therefore are indifferent. Thus,
because some consumers prefer the nonlinear schedule and no consumers
are harmed by it, this schedule is Pareto superior to a linear one, and
profits are still greater than maximum profits without bundling." 19
This section has examined an alternative, noncoercive pricing strat-
egy available to firms most likely to utilize coercive tie-ins in the absence
of an antitrust prohibition. We have established that nonlinear pricing
strategies can generate profits approximating the profits available
through tying. Thus, we believe that the current antitrust status of tie-
ins only encourages the adoption of these nonlinear strategies. If, as we
have shown, profits to the seller under nonlinear pricing strategies ap-
proximate those from tie-ins and if, as we will argue in the next section,
these strategies are legal, then the prohibition of tying arrangements
could not significantly inhibit the leverage which the Court associates
with tie-ins.
Antitrust Analysis of Nonlinear Pricing
Our argument for abandoning the rule of per se illegality of tying
arrangements is that current doctrine only encourages the use of an alter-







wherep Px 4 andPb - 8
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native pricing strategy which is unobjectionable and which yields compa-
rable profits. Having outlined such a strategy and having demonstrated
its profit potential, 20 it remains to be shown that it is, in fact, unobjec-
tionable from an antitrust standpoint.
Nonlinear pricing should withstand antitrust challenges primarily
because of the economic considerations. Of course, nonlinear pricing
should not be held per se illegal under tie-in doctrine for the same rea-
sons that have been advanced by economists and discussed here regard-
ing tying arrangements in general: tying arrangements rarely involve
leverage, often involve efficiencies, and are costly to prohibit. 21 But even
if, as we will assume, the Court's economic theories of tying arrange-
ments were sound, nonlinear pricing can increase consumer welfare rela-
tive to single item pricing given a seller's monopoly in the basic product
market.122 We have shown in the previous section that this is a possible
outcome when the seller has priced the basic product so as to produce
Pareto superiority. 123 Given the Court's current endorsement of the con-
sumer welfare standard for evaluating antitrust challenges,' 24 an expan-
120. See supra notes 86-119 & accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 42-85 & accompanying text.
5R
122. To make even buyers to the left of "-- prefer this pricing plan, some of the increased
profits to the monopolist can be fed back to consumers by setting the price of the basic product
sold individually p, a little lower.
The result is a nonlinear schedule which consumers and the monopolist prefer by over a
linear schedule. As long as a horizontal bundled schedule intersects the linear unbundledR
schedule px + rPr to the right of - all consumers prefer or are indifferent to the plan and the2 R
seller earns more profits. It can be proven that, given p. and a bundled price Pb > Px + Pr,
profits of the seller increase. Let the firm set the most profitable linear payment schedule in2+2ex-er
which Px - 4 . A general way of expressing any bundled alternative is to set Pb =
Px+(1- )cr, where E > o is an arbitrary constant and r. = 1-E. For Px and Pb profits are
calculated to be
1 12 E
2 cr2  1
17= -W+ -Cr 2R2) + ( --E).
8 24 2 2
Ignoring the last term on the right, these are profits from the strict linear strategy. As E
approaches 0 or , profits approach these earnings, and whenever 0 < E < 'A, profits for the
monopolist are greater than the linear profits since the last part of the above expression is
positive for such values of E. By again feeding back some of the increased profits in lower
prices to those consumers indifferent to having a choice, any arbitrary uniform price that cuts
the profit maximizing nonbundling schedule above r. = 'A is preferred by all market partici-
pants and is therefore strongly Pareto superior.
There exists, therefore, a family of nonlinear schedules that are more efficient than purely
linear schedules.
123. See supra notes 119, 122 & accompanying text.
124. The Supreme Court, specifically the Burger Court, has adopted a pragmatic, effi-
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sion of the prohibition of tying arrangements to include a prohibition of
nonlinear pricing strategies would be unwise.
Case law concerning the legality of nonlinear pricing is somewhat
sparse, despite the fact that these strategies are commonly used.' 2 5 Per-
haps this scarcity is due to the Supreme Court's statement in Northern
Pacific that "where the buyer is free to take either product by itself there
is no tying problem even though the seller may also offer the two items as
a unit at a single price."' 2 6 Arguably, this is the definitive word on the
legality of nonlinear pricing. Some lower courts, however, have indi-
cated that price tie-ins may be illegal under certain circumstances. 27 In
view of the Court's treatment of "coercion" in Jefferson Parish Hospi-
tal,128 it is important to clarify the conditions under which courts will
find that nonlinear pricing permits enough "consumer freedom" to avoid
illegality.' 2 9 The antitrust analysis that follows shows that a pricing
strategy that presents viable alternatives to consumers will be considered
non-coercive. Truly nonlinear strategies present such viable alternatives
and thus probably will not be held illegal.
ciency oriented antitrust policy which stresses the importance of maximizing consumer wel-
fare. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (legislative history of the
Sherman Act "suggest[s] that Congress designed [it] . .. as a 'consumer welfare prescrip-
tion' " (quoting R. BORK, supra note 44, at 66)); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 53 (1977) ("Competitive economics has social and political as well as economic
advantages. . . but an antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any
objective benchmarks"); see also Easterbrook, Is There A Racket in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEX. L.
REV. 705 (1982); Liebeler, supra note 82, at 1317 ("From an economic standpoint, the goal of
antitrust law is to balance allocative and productive efficiency in an attempt to maximize the
total wealth of society.").
For the view that antitrust law should be concerned with more than consumer welfare, see
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 8, at 376 ("The antitrust laws do not deal solely with problems of
allocative efficiency."); Redlich, The Burger Court and the Per Se Rule, 44 ALB. L. REV. 1
(1979). See also Bohling, A Simplified Rule of Reason for Vertical Restraints: Integrating So-
cial Goals, Economic Analysis and Sylvania, 64 IOWA L. REV. 461 (1979) (interpreting
Supreme Court cases as not precluding an antitrust doctrine based on noneconomic goals).
For an analysis of the tradeoffs between efficiency and other societal goals, see Elzinga,
The Goals of Antitrust. Other Than Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191
(1977). Elzinga stresses that efficiency and equity are not necessarily mutually exclusive goals,
but he cautions against pursuing equity when they happen to diverge: "While it may seem
tolerant, even humanitarian, to call for equity at the expense of efficiency, those who do so
seldom are the ones suffering the loss in real wealth." Id. at 1213.
125. See supra notes 89-90 & accompanying text.
126. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 n.4 (1958). Note also that the
injunction in United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 52-56 (1962), permitted package pric-
ing, an important part of nonlinear pricing schemes.
127. See infra notes 130-61 & accompanying text.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 30-40.
129. Id. See generally Varner, Voluntary Ties and the Sherman Act, 50 S. CAL. L. REV.
271 (1977).
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The clearest example of nonlinear pricing that has been challenged
is found in American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. American
Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. 130 The case involved television
advertising by the Kemper Insurance Companies on ABC's early evening
news program. Kemper had identified ninety-five stations as its desired
advertising lineup, but conflict arose concerning the sale of advertising
on thirty-two unwanted stations. ABC, in essence, told Kemper that it
would cost the same to sponsor the program on all available131 affiliates
as it would to sponsor it on only the stations Kemper desired. In fact,
there would be substantial additional charges to cover the cost of black-
ing-out the unwanted stations. 132 Kemper was given the option of select-
ing its own stations and paying for them at the individual "rate card"
prices, prices which represented a ninety percent increase over the previ-
ously negotiated package price. Kemper dropped its demand to limit the
advertising to its optimal lineup and agreed to sponsor the program on
all available affiliates.1
33
When Kemper did not fulfill its obligations under the contract, ABC
130. 446 F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1063 (1972).
131. One problem was that Kemper's lineup included 28 stations not yet committed to
carrying the Evening Report. ABC and Kemper agreed that Kemper would have an option to
advertise on the undecided stations that eventually decided to pick up the Evening Report.
446 F.2d at 1134.
132. Id. at 1135.







0 67 99 Quantity of
Stations
In the figure, pi represents a linear pricing schedule where each station is offered separately. PB
is the bundle price for the 99 cleared stations. Pno is the bundle price plus the blackout fee. pi
is 90% greater than PB. The effective nonlinear pricing strategy is reflected by Oab.
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filed suit in state court to recover damages. The antitrust issue arose as a
defense that the contract constituted an illegal tying arrangement under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 134 Kemper then filed an antitrust action in
federal district court, seeking damages incurred in the state court litiga-
tion. 35  After a summary judgment and dismissal, 36 Kemper
appealed. 
37
In reversing the summary judgment, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals commented:
As we view the law, where there is no quality or distinguishing desider-
atum between a product offered singly or in a package, the seller can-
not charge substantially higher for the individual product if the price
differential has the effect of conditioning the sale of the single product to
the sale of the entire package and if the difference in price cannot be
legitimately justified by cost considerations. 38
The court thus implied that the element of coercion necessary for an
illegal tying arrangement is present when the only viable choice
presented to the buyer is the package. 39 On remand, the district court
found for ABC, and Kemper again appealed. Rejecting the argument
that delay tactics in negotiations constitute a violation of the Sherman
Act, the Second Circuit reiterated its position that "there can be no ille-
gal tie unless unlawful coercion by the seller influences the buyer's
choice." 140
134. Id. at 1132.
135. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc.,
270 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
136. Id. at 650. The district court found, inter alia, that there was no tying arrangement
because only one product was involved. Id. at 646.
137. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc.,
388 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1967).
138. Id. at 283 (emphasis added). The Second Circuit had assumed, arguendo, that more
than one product was involved. Id.
139. See American Mfrs. Mut., 388 F.2d at 283-84. The district court found for ABC on
the ground that Kemper "acted unreasonably in failing to negotiate further with ABC" over
the elimination of the undesired stations. American Mfrs. Mut., 446 F.2d at 1133.
140. 446 F.2d at 1137. On appeal, Kemper alleged that the district judge had applied
erroneous principles of law in rejecting the tying argument. Kemper offered a new formulation
of illegal tying: "whenever a seller offers a buyer a package; the buyer states he only wants
certain items in the package, and the seller delays at all in offering to sell the designated items
at prices which are equivalent to the package price," id. at 1136, then the seller has violated the
Sherman Act. The Second Circuit rejected Kemper's proposal:
We find this sweeping proposition untenable. . . . Here, ABC exerted no pres-
sure on Kemper, successful or not. . . . To adopt Kemper's position would subject
businesses to threats of antitrust sanctions whenever they tried by bravado to buttress
a sagging market position by initially offering small quantities of desired goods at
high prices, in hopes of eliciting a large order without further negotiation. Such
bartering ploys are not generally the concern of antitrust laws.
Id. at 1136-37.
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In Consolidated Terminal Systems, Inc. v. ITT World Communica-
tions, Inc.,141 nonlinear pricing was unsuccessfully challenged by the
seller of a competing tying product. Consolidated, the plaintiff, was a
supplier of telex terminals and related equipment. The five defendants
were authorized by the FCC to provide international telex transmission
service from points within the United States to points abroad. 142 Consol-
idated challenged the defendants' nonlinear pricing scheme as an illegal
tying arrangement under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 143 Under this
scheme, international telex subscribers were offered free or below cost
equipment in return for a promise to use the transmission service of a
particular defendant; the tying equipment was also available on less
favorable terms to customers who did not make this promise. 144 At trial,
the district court judge held that Consolidated could not state a claim of
per se illegality with respect to the alleged tying arrangement because of
the unusual characterization of the facts of the case. 145 The court then
refused to find the practice illegal under the rule of reason because Con-
solidated, as a competitor in the market for the tying product, did not
have standing to complain of the suppression of competition in the mar-
ket for the tied product.
146
One case out of the Ninth Circuit has considered the legality of a
nonlinear pricing strategy, focusing particularly on the coercion element
and distinguishing an earlier Fourth Circuit case which had found a co-
ercive price tie-in to be illegal. The nonlinear pricing strategy challenged
in Ways & Means, Inc. v. IVAC Corp. 147 was a marketing plan under
141. 535 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
142. Consolidated was not authorized to, and did not provide, any telex transmission ser-
vice. Prior to 1980, the defendants bundled the sale of the transmission service and related
equipment through a "unified" rate structure that allowed for the recovery of related equip-
ment costs through charges for the transmission service. On February 15, 1980, the FCC
ordered the "unbundling" of the rate so that the telex equipment could be sold separately. Id.
at 226.
143. The plaintiff also attacked the practice under § 2 of the Sherman Act as a conspiracy
to monopolize the telex equipment market because all the defendants used the same nonlinear
pricing strategy. The plaintiff failed to allege the market share of any defendants, and the
court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss Consolidated's § 2 claim. Id. at 228-29.
144. Id. at 231.
145. Id. The case was unusual because the relevant focus for tie-in claims is ordinarily the
market for the tied product. In Consolidated Terminals, the tying product was telex equip-
ment, and the tied product was international transmission service. The plaintiff alleged that its
survival in the tying product market-terminals and related supplies-was threatened by the
tying arrangement. Id.; cf In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F. Supp. 393, 399-403
(N.D. Ill. 1979) (tying arrangements may also foreclose seller's competitors for the tying prod-
uct); P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 54, at I 733e.
146. 535 F. Supp. at 232.
147. 506 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Cal. 1979), affd per curiam, 638 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1981).
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which the defendant manufacturer (IVAC) rented its entire electronic
temperature-taking system on the condition that the lessee agree to
purchase 15,000 probe covers. 148 IVAC's customers also had the option
of purchasing the individual components at a reasonably attractive price
and then purchasing the probe covers on the open market.149  Approxi-
mately twenty-five percent of IVAC's sales of components occurred
through the latter option.' 50
The plaintiff, a competitor of IVAC who manufactured IVAC-com-
patible probe covers, brought suit alleging that the marketing plan was a
tying arrangement in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The
district court noted the availability of the direct sale option of purchasing
the alleged tying product without the probe cover. Relying on the
Supreme Court's statement in Northern Pacific,1 5 1 the court concluded
that the "tie-in" did not contain the coercive conditions necessary for a
violation.' 52 In the IVAC case, plaintiffs relied on a Fourth Circuit case,
Advance Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp. '53 There the de-
fendant, a copy paper retailer, had offered copying machines through a
"copy service" plan. Under the plan, customers paid a fiat fee per copy
and were provided with an entire duplicating system, including copier,
service, paper, toner, and other materials.- 54 The court objected to the
plan because the defendant's highly desirable copying machines could be
purchased separately only at a prohibitively high price. 55 The SCM
court held that pricing tie-ins "are non-coercive, and therefore legal, only
if the components are separately available to the customer on a basis as
favorable as the tie-in arrangement."' 56
In addressing plaintiffs' argument in reliance on the SCM case, the
148. The system included thermometer, accessories, maintenance, and in-service training
for hospital personnel. Id. at 699.
149. In fact, IVAC initially marketed the product through the traditional discrete sale. Id.
However, because of hospital administrator's concerns about large capital expenditures, possi-
ble early obsolescence, and competency of staff to use the system, IVAC changed its marketing
approach to the one described in the text. Hospital administrators found the new approach
attractive because it allowed them to acquire the new technology with operating (rather than
capital) funds. Id.
150. Id. at 699-700. IVAC's pricing strategy was clearly nonlinear. Refer to Figure 4,
supra text accompanying note 95. The term p. represents the direct sale option, and Pb repre-
sents the price of the entire system. The evidence indicates that 25% of the purchasers were to
the left of ro.
151. See supra text accompanying note 126.
152. 506 F. Supp. at 700.
153. 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
154. Id. at 59-60.
155. Id. at 62.
156. Id.
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IVA C court noted the significant percentage of sales outside of the lease-
purchase tie-in and concluded that "plaintiffs have failed to produce suf-
ficient evidence from which any inference of unfairness can be drawn
with respect to defendant's pricing policy."'1 57 The district court granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed.1 5
8
Nonlinear pricing strategies will always resemble the scheme in
IVAC in the respect which the court found relevant. A large number of
unbundled sales will always occur.159 These strategies also will always be
distinguishable from the scheme which the SCM court held illegal. The
SCM scheme was linear and coercive. 160 Nonlinear pricing always pro-
vides consumers with a viable alternative to purchasing the bundle.' 6'
In summary, the economic effects of nonlinear pricing are such that
157. 506 F. Supp. at 702.
158. Ways & Means, Inc. v. IVAC Corp., 638 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1981).
159. See supra note 109 & accompanying text.
160. The pricing strategy in SCM Corp. is very similar to the usual tie-in sale, but does not




In the figure, p. is the price for the tying good and p is the bundled price. Since p, is less
than p., customers will not view p. as a reasonable alternative to p. The prices are set in a
manner that effectively coerces the customers into purchasing the bundle. This is the essence
of a "price tie-in." The pricing strategy is linear since the alternative price functions do not
intersect. That is, the lower, bundled price line would always be selected.
161. Moreover, some consumers will prefer the bundle and others will prefer the linear
pricing option. This effectively rules out the possibility of a class action attack on a nonlinear
pricing strategy under the so-called "individual coercion" doctrine. See generally Austin, The
Individual Coercion Doctrine in Tie-In Analysis: Confusing and Irrelevant, 65 CALIF. L. REV.
1143 (1977); Blair and Finci, supra note 30, at 558-63. Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, under which most antitrust class actions are brought, requires that the court
certify "that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members." The nonlinear pricing defendant will
be able to show that certification would be improper because the pricing strategy is specifically
November 1984] TIE-IN SALES
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
it should not be held illegal under antitrust law. Moreover, the case law
associated with nonlinear strategies and price tie-ins indicates that a find-
ing of illegality requires a showing that challenged schemes effectively
coerce buyers into purchasing the offered package. While coercive price
tie-ins can thus be held illegal under tying doctrine, nonlinear pricing is
non-coercive, and therefore not illegal, because it presents buyers with
meaningful purchase options. 162 The widespread use of nonlinear pricing
also suggests that attacking such practices would be impractical.
163
Conclusion
Per se illegality is only appropriate when an act is certain, or almost
certain, to create social losses. Furthermore, prohibition of an action
must result in avoiding those losses at a reasonable enforcement cost.
The Supreme Court, in maintaining its per se prohibition of tying, has
chosen to ignore economists' well-reasoned attacks on the view that tying
arrangements create monopoly power. Even if the Court's analysis of
tying arrangements were correct, however, our analysis indicates that the
per se prohibition of tie-in sales would not result in a significant increase
in consumer welfare. The losses that allegedly result from tying arrange-
ments are not avoided by a strict prohibition because firms shift their
activities to different methods that are not illegal. Nonlinear pricing
strategies, which are legally available to firms that, according to the
Court's view, could otherwise use tying arrangments to extend their mo-
nopoly power, may be as profitable as tying arrangements. Thus, the
potential gains from an effective prohibition of tie-in sales are small. Con-
sidering that the resources devoted to the enforcement of the prohibition
may well exceed the potential gains from such enforcement, the per se
prohibition should be abandoned.
designed to present different options to different customers. It would be impossible to prove
that each plaintiff was coerced.
162. See also Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391 (4th Cir.
1974) (holding that reduced rates to those who purchased advertising in both defendant's
newspaper and magazine were not per se illegal as tie-ins because of the voluntary nature of
the rate).
163. One final possible objection to tie-ins and nonlinear pricing is that they might involve
predatory pricing in the tied product market. See, e.g., Greenville Publishing Co., 496 F.2d at
396-99 (pricing strategy challenged on this basis). There are numerous predatory pricing theo-
ries, and numerous rules for detecting and prosecuting predatory pricing have been proposed.
See Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHi. L. REV. 263 (1981)
(survey and critique of the theories and policy proposals). Some writers, including Easter-
brook, conclude that there is no reason for antitrust law to take predation seriously. See, e.g.,
R. BORK, supra note 44, at 144-60 (1978); McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. &
ECON. 289 (1980). In any event, the nonlinear pricing strategy outlined here does not involve
below-cost pricing in either market and thus could not be construed as predatory pricing.
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We conclude that the appropriate legal approach to tying is a rule of
reason analysis that includes a presumption of legality. This approach
would rid the courts of many cases in which there is no hope of any
social gain from enforcing the law and would restrict attention to the few
cases in which enforcment might improve the performance of the mar-
ket. The Court should only prohibit tying when there is substantial like-
lihood of eliminating significant losses through legal action.
164
Moreover, although the congressional intent to prohibit tie-in sales
is evident in the Clayton Act and its legislative history, 165 our analysis
demonstrates that the effect of a tie-in is not "to substantially lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly" because alternative pricing strate-
gies can accomplish similar economic results. The Court's analysis
under the Sherman Act should be modified-abandoning the per se rule
for a rule of reason-because, even if monopoly extension through tying
arrangements were feasible, the legal, nonlinear pricing alternative viti-
.ates any significant positive economic effect due to prohibition. The
move to a rule of reason analysis of tying arrangements under both the
Clayton Act and the Sherman Act would serve to reverse a futile, ineffi-
cient, and unwarranted policy.
164. If it is reasonable to expect that the tying arrangement would create barriers to entry,
legal action would be appropriate. This Article does not address the barriers to entry aspect of
tying, but such an effect from a tying arrangement could be determined by a rule of reason
analysis.
165. See supra note 7.
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